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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION' OR THE SAME SIN2.
KEN FEAGINS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Though all things foul would wear the brows of grace,
yet grace must still look so. 3
Some advocates view affirmative action as a valid part of this na-
* Associate, Vial, Hamilton, Koch & Knox, Dallas, Tex. B.L.S. 1985, University of
Oklahoma; J.D. 1989, Vanderbilt University School of Law. © 1990 by Ken Feagins.
I thank Robert Belton, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law, who
taught me by example the true meaning of exchange of ideas. His guidance, infinite
patience, and encouragement are very much appreciated. I would also like to thank A.
Darby Dickerson, an associate at Locke Purnell Rain Harrell in Dallas, for her review of
earlier drafts of this article. The views contained herein, however, are solely my own.
1. "Affirmative action" is a policy designed to remedy the present effects of past
discrimination. Affirmative action plans expressly take race and sex into account. There
are two basic kinds of affirmative action. The first type restructures the recruitment
process to include minorities in the applicant pool. I have no problem with this type of
affirmative action plan.
The second form of affirmative action, however, establishes goals, quotas, and
timetables, and relies on race or sex as the dispositive factor in awarding jobs and
promotions, see Belton, Reflections on Affirmative Action After Paradise and Johnson, 23 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 115-16 n.l (1988). Consequently, minority candidates are preferred
over better qualified nonminority candidates. This article focuses on the second type of
affirmative action.
A nonexhaustive list of benefits and opportunities subject to affirmative action
includes: gaining employment or promotions; not being terminated from employment;
gaining admission into training programs, professional schools, or graduate programs.
2. In the text, I have coined the term "samesin" to describe the "same sin" of
continuing race- and sex-consciousness. Samesin is discrimination based on race or sex
that occurs under the euphemistic guise of "affirmative action."
"Samesin" refers to the "original sin" of discrimination, historically directed toward
blacks and women. The overt racism and sexism inherent in the implementation of
voluntary affirmative action plans is virtually identical to the overt racism and sexism that
have plagued our nation from its birth. "Benign" discrimination on the basis of race or
sex is a myth. Any discrimination based solely on race or sex is inherently wrong and
destructive to society, even if dressed in the euphemistic clothing of affirmative action.
Affirmative action results in segregation rather than integration.
As ChiefJustice William Rehnquist stated in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 228 n.10 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting):
I see no irony in a law that prohibits all voluntary racial (or sexual) discrimination,
even discrimination directed at whites in favor of blacks. The evil inherent in
discrimination against Negroes is that it is based on an immutable characteristic
... . The characteristic becomes no less immutable and irrelevant, and
discrimination based thereon becomes no less evil, simply because the person
excluded is a member of one race rather than another. Far from ironic, I find a
prohibition on all preferential treatment based on race (or sex) as elementary and
fundamental as the principal that "two wrongs do not make a right."
But see Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV.
78 (1986).
Although I oppose voluntary affirmative action plans insofar as they operate to dis-
criminate overtly on the basis of race or sex, I recognize that egregious situations exist and
raise different issues concerning court ordered remedies. E.g., United States v. Paradise,
480 U.S. 149 (1987).
3. W. SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, Act IV, scene iii.
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tion's desire to build "a racially integrated society for the future,"'4 while
others endorse it as an appropriate remedy for past discrimination. 5 De-
spite such euphemisms, public6 discrimination on the basis of race or
sex is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment 7 and is not the least intrusive means avail-
able for the state to achieve its goal of an equal opportunity society;8
illegal because it violates the express provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964;9 immoral because it is inherently wrong; and destruc-
tive because it sows seeds of resentment in innocent victims.' 0 "Affirma-
tive action" is the "samesin"' '-the continuation and propagation of
"separate but equal" race- and sex-consciousness. It is Plessy v. Fergu-
son 12 in reverse. '
3
As a result of affirmative action programs, marginally qualified
white males rapidly are replacing black females as the group most fre-
quently discriminated against in American society. Whether directed
against blacks or whites, men or women, racism and sexism remain ra-
cism and sexism. Our society will never achieve the dream of equality
until, as a matter of public policy, it becomes completely blind' 4 to both
race and sex. My quarrel, therefore, is not with the ends of affirmative
action plans, but with the means.
The concept of voluntary affirmative action as a weapon to combat
discrimination by employers was sanctioned as early as 1961. In that
year, President John F. Kennedy issued an executive order' 5 which es-
tablished the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity
and announced that the federal government, as employer, would not
discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or national origin. 16 Twenty-eight
4. Sullivan, supra note 2, at 98.
5. Id. at 97.
6. Although private discrimination on the basis of race or sex raises first amendment
concerns, such as the freedom to choose those with whom one associates, that discussion
is beyond the scope of this article.
7. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I.
8. I am referring to the "narrowly tailored" prong of the analysis. See Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1986).
10. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46
U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 779 (1979) (quoting A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133
(1975)).
11. The word "samesin" is coined. See supra note 2.
12. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
13. If discrimination on the basis of race or sex is wrong, it should make no difference
"who" is discriminated against. The evil itself is not dependent upon the popularity or
vulnerability of the victim. Nor is discrimination any less evil merely because the Court is
clever enough to substitute the term "affirmative action" for the term "discrimination."
14. See, e.g., Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1312 (1986) (discussing different views on affirmative action).
15. Executive Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-63 Compilation); accord Belton,
Discrimination and Affirmative Action: An Analysis of Competing Theories of Equality and Weber,
N.C.L. REV. 531, 533 n.9 (1981).
16. 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-63 Compilation). The President stated:
WHEREAS it is the plain and positive obligation of the United States Gov-
ernment to promote and ensure equal opportunity for all qualified persong, with-
out regard to race, creed, color, or national origin, employed or seeking
employment with the Federal Government and on government contracts; . . ..
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years later, affirmative action remains one of the most "starkly divi-
sive ' 17 issues in our country. Its proponents wage an all-out war in
favor of "preferential treatment" for minorities and women,18 while its
opponents insist that choices must be "color-blind."' 9 The debate
within the United States Supreme Court is as heated as that among vari-
ous factions of the general public. Recently, the Court upheld voluntary
affirmative action plans in United Steelworkers v. Weber20 and Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 2 ' while striking down affirmative action plans in
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 22 and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co. 23
The question to be answered, therefore, is: Under what circum-
stances, if any, is it appropriate to consider race or sex when conferring
benefits 24 in either the public or private sector? There are three op-
tions. 25 First, race or sex always2 6 should be considered. Second, race
or sex never should be considered.2 7 Or third, race or sex should some-
times be considered.
28
The choice is dependent upon four factors: (1) the extent to which
our national policy, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court,
is color-blind; (2) the extent to which our national policy should be
color-blind; (3) the extent to which laws prohibiting discrimination actu-
ally protect individuals rather than groups; and (4) the extent to which
laws prohibiting discrimination should protect individuals rather than
groups.29
This article discusses the Supreme Court's stance on affirmative ac-
tion plans in light of Weber, WygantJohnson, and Croson, and focuses pri-
marily on plans promulgated under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment3 0 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3 1
[t]here is hereby established the President's Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity.
Id.
17. Sullivan, supra note 2, at 78.
18. Id.
19. E.g., Reynolds, Individualism v. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE L.j. 995,
998 (1984).
20. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
21. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
22. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
23. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
24. Belton, supra note 1, at 115-16.
25. Id. at 116.
26. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Cm. L. REV. 723
(1974). As Professor Belton notes, however, "there appears to be little, if any, support for
the proposition that race or sex should always be taken into account in the allocation pro-
cess." Belton, supra note I, at 116.
27. Belton, supra note 1, at 116 n.2.
28. Id. at 116 n.3.
29. This article is limited to a discussion of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment of the United States Constitution and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1986). Although the cases discussed herein deal
primarily with race, their principles also apply to other immutable characteristics, such as
sex, color, and national origin.
30. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1986).
1990]
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Part II reviews the affirmative action debate and summarizes the legal
background. The discussion treats seriatim the "always," "never," and
"sometimes" responses to the fundamental policy question of when
benefits should be conferred on the basis of immutable characteristics,
first in the equal protection context,3 2 and then under Title VII.3 3 Part
III analyzes the Court's current standards for determining whether vol-
untary public plans are legitimate under equal protection and Title
VII.3 4 Part IV suggests various alternatives to current affirmative action
plans,3 5 and explains why Weber and Johnson should be overruled.3 6 Part
V illustrates why the operation of voluntary affirmative action plans is
virtually identical to the Plessy "separate but equal" doctrine. 3 7 Part VI
concludes by stressing the urgent need to adopt Justice Harlan's "color-
blind" approach 38 so that we may build a racially integrated, not segre-
gated, society.
39
II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SURVEY
A. Equal Protection-The "Always" Response
The legal evolution of affirmative action has seen support for all of
the policy options. Plessy v. Ferguson4 0 represents the Supreme Court's
"always" response under the equal protection clause.
The primary issue in Plessy was whether a Louisiana state law requir-
ing "equal but separate" 4 1 accommodations for whites and blacks riding
on passenger trains violated the equal protection clause of the federal
Constitution. Mr. Plessy, who was seven-eights white and one-eighth
black, refused to obey the conductor's orders to vacate a seat reserved
for whites and occupy one set aside for blacks. As a result of his disobe-
dience, he was forcibly ejected from his seat, and incarcerated in a New
Orleans jail. With only Justice Harlan dissenting, the Court upheld the
law, 42 commenting that the fourteenth amendment "could not have
been intended to abolish [legal] distinctions based upon color."'43
By sustaining Louisiana's "separate but equal" law, the Court en-
32. See infra notes 40-90 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 91-133 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 134-83 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 184-246 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 184-221 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 247-70 and accompanying text.
38. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In opposition to the majority's
"separate but equal" holding, Justice Harlan stated that "[ojur Constitution is color-blind,
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citi-
zens are equal before the law." Id. at 559.
39. See infra notes 271-82 and accompanying text.
40. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
41. Id. at 540.
42. The Plessy majority stated:
A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and
colored races-a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, and
which must always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the other
race by color-has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races ....
Id. at 543.
43. Id. at 544.
424 [Vol. 67:3
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dorsed overt racism. With this holding, the Court effectively announced
that, under the equal protection clause, discrimination on the basis of
race is "always" appropriate.4 4 Legal distinctions based on race, con-
cluded the Court, "[have] no tendency to destroy the legal equality of
the two races."
45
The Court's "always" response prevailed for over fifty years. In
1954, however, the Court acknowledged the evil inherent in the sin of
racial discrimination, and adopted the "never" response.
B. Equal Protection-The "Never" Response
Brown v. Board of Education46 established an individual's right
-never" to be disadvantaged by law due to his or her race. 47 This read-
ing of Brown reflects the "color-blind" view of the Constitution, enunci-
ated by Justice Harlan in Plessy.4 8 The burning issue in Brown was
whether a Kansas statute, 49 which permitted but did not require sepa-
rate schools for blacks and whites, violated equal protection.
50
Under the guise of statutory authority, the Kansas school board de-
nied blacks admission to public schools attended by whites. After con-
cluding that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate
but equal' has no place,"' 5 ' the Court held that separate treatment on
the basis of race did indeed violate equal protection.
52
Although an "activist reading ' 53 of Brown interprets the Court's
holding as the quintessential "never" response, some of the Court's
post-Brown opinions retreated from this hard-line position and con-
strued the equal protection clause to mean that race "sometimes" may
be considered.
54
44. Although Plessy dealt only with race, the underlying rationale of "separate but
equal" is applicable to the other immutable characteristics.
45. 163 U.S. at 543.
46. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. But see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1525-58 (2d ed. 1988), in which
Professor Tribe suggests that an "activist reading" of Brown "creates a right that the four-
teenth amendment's language does not really suggest and that the fourteenth amend-
ment's authors-authors who did not regard even racial segregation in public schools as
offensive to the amendment-would certainly not have endorsed." Id. at 1526.
48. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
49. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1724 (1949).
50. Compare Brown, 347 U.S. at 486 n.1 with lVeber, 443 U.S. at 205-07 (interpreting
Title VII to permit, but not require preferential treatment on the basis of race). Under a
narrow reading of Weber, the Court's interpretation of Title VII, which permits but does
not require voluntary racial discrimination to correct racial imbalances, is arguably uncon-
stitutional. In other words, the [Veber construction of Title VII violates the fifth amend-
ment in the same way the Kansas statute failed to protect the equal protection guarantees
of the fourteenth in Brown.
51. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
52. Id.
53. See L. TRIBE, supra note 47, at 1526; Tribe, In What Vision of the Constitution Must the
Law Be Color-blind?, 20J. MARSHALL L. REV. 201, 204-05 (1986).
54. See, e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280-84 (1986) (striking down a voluntary race-con-
scious affirmative action plan under the equal protection clause because it was "not suffi-
ciently narrowly tailored," but clearly indicating that other race-conscious plans which
satisfied certain criteria would be constitutional); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
1990] 425
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
C. Equal Protection-The "Sometimes" Response
1. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 5 5 is representative of the
Court's "sometimes" response in the equal protection context. Bakke
addressed whether the voluntary affirmative action plan at the University
of California-Davis Medical School, which reserved sixteen out of one
hundred available spaces in an entering class for disadvantaged and mi-
nority students, violated equal protection.
Allan Bakke, a white male, applied for admission to the Medical
School in 1973 and again in 1974. He was rejected both times. Each
year, however, the school admitted minority applicants with qualifica-
tions significantly lower than Bakke's. Following his second rejection,
Bakke filed suit alleging that the school's affirmative action plan violated
his rights under Title V156 and the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
Bakke won his suit, and was admitted to the Medical School. Yet,
the Court was unwilling to hold that discrimination on the basis of sex
was "always" illegal. Justice Powell supported the adoption of standards
of the Harvard College Admission Program, which used race as one fac-
tor among many in the admissions process.
5 7
The Court's "sometimes" approach to equal protection is embod-
ied in Justice Powell's endorsement of Harvard's Admission Program:
"In such an admissions program, race or ethnic background may be
deemed a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file, yet it does not insulate
the individual from comparison with all other candidates." '5 8 Justice
Powell, therefore, approved the use of race as a factor as long as a plan
did not operate as a "cover for the functional equivalent of a quota
system."
5 9
2. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education60 is a recent illustration of the
"sometimes" response in the equal protection setting. In Wygant, the
Jackson Board of Education entered a collective-bargaining agreement
which provided that layoffs of teachers would be governed by seniority,
"[e]xcept that at no time will there be a greater percentage of minority
personal laid off than the current percentage of minority personnel em-
438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978) (Justice Powell supporting the Harvard College Admission Pro-
gram, which uses race as a factor in the admissions process).
55. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
56. Title VI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq., provides for nondiscrimination based on race,
color, or national origin in federally assisted programs. Under Title VI, any program re-
ceiving federal financial aid may not discriminate on the grounds of race, color, or national
origin.
57. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323 (indicating support for the use of race as a factor among
many in admissions programs as applied in the Harvard College Admissions Program).
58. Id. at 317.
59. Id. at 318.
60. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
[Vol. 67:3
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ployed at the time of the layoff."'' l When senior nonminority teachers
were released before more junior minority teachers, the displaced
nonminority teachers brought suit under the equal protection clause.
6 2
The district court held that the preferential layoffs did not violate
equal protection because the policy attempted to provide minority
teachers as role models for minority students, 6 3 and because the plan
was an attempt to remedy past "societal discrimination. " 64 The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, only to
be reversed by the Supreme Court.
6 5
In nullifying the affirmative action plan, which was both public and
voluntary, the Wygant Court adhered to its "sometimes" approach to
equal protection. The plurality, led by Justice Powell, employed a bur-
den-sharing approach and emphasized "that in order to remedy the ef-
fects of prior discrimination, it may be necessary to take race into
account."' 66 Under this policy, innocent individuals would be forced to
"bear some of the burden of the remedy."' 67 However, the plurality in-
sisted that a two-pronged strict scrutiny test must be satisfied before any
plan could discriminate in favor of minorities: "There are two prongs to
the examination. First, any racial classification 'must be justified by a
compelling governmental interest'." '68 "Second, the means chosen by
the [s]tate to effectuate its purpose must be 'narrowly tailored to the
achievement of that goal'." '69 The first prong demands that the govern-
ment have a compelling interest in discriminating on the basis of race,
70
and the second requires that the means chosen by the government be
narrowly tailored to achieving its goal.
7 1
The plurality held that the Wygant plan violated equal protection. It
was not "sufficiently narrowly tailored" 72 because the race-based layoffs
imposed an unreasonable burden upon innocent individuals. At the
same time, however, the Court clearly indicated that hiring plans that
discriminate on the basis of race are less intrusive and would be
61. Id. at 270.
62. Id. at 272.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 546 F. Supp. 1195, 1199-1201 (E.D. Mich. 1982),
aff'd, 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
66. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280.
67. Id. at 280-81 (stating that "[als part of this Nation's dedication to eradicating ra-
cial discrimination, innocent persons may be called upon to bear some of the burden of
the remedy").
68. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 (quoting Palmore v. Didoti, 446 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)).
69. Id. (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980)).
70. Id. Discrimination on the basis of sex receives only mid-level scrutiny. Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
71. The term "narrowly tailored" means that no less intrusive means are available to
the government. In other words, if lawful, less restrictive alternatives could have been
used by the government to accomplish the same compelling interest, a plan that discrimi-
nates on the basis of race is unconstitutional. Wyganl, 476 U.S. at 280 n.6.
72. Id. at 283.
1990]
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upheld. 73
Bakke and Wygant suggested that the Court, through the concept of
burden sharing, 74 had adopted the "sometimes" response. However, a
logical deduction after Bakke and Wygant was that under the equal pro-
tection clause, race- and sex-conscious plans that expressly applied
"separate but equal" criteria to minorities and whites, 75 women and
men, 76 minority women and men, or minority women and white men
sometimes would be upheld. 77 The Court apparently had rejected the
spirit of Brown and was on the verge of resurrecting the "always" re-
sponse of Plessy.
D. Equal Protection-Deja Vu: The "Never" Response
On January 23, 1989, the Court took a giant step forward, moving
closer to the "never" response. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson,7 8 the
majority recognized that supporting any type of public discrimination
based solely on race, "benign" or not, "assures that race will always be
relevant in American life."' 79 Using a modified version of the two-
pronged strict scrutiny analysis articulated in Wygant, the Court struck
down Richmond's Minority Business Utilization Plan.80
The Richmond plan required general contractors awarded city con-
struction contracts to hire minority subcontractors for at least 30% of
the dollar amount of each project. 8 1 The plan failed the first prong
(known as the legitimate factual predicate prong) of the equal protection
test for the same reasons that the Wygant plan failed. 82 First, the city's
justification for the plan was no more than a "generalized assertion"
that minorities had suffered discrimination in the past. However, the
city was unable to substantiate the scope of the injury the plan sought to
redress. Thus, like the minority teacher as role model theory rejected in
Wygant, the Richmond plan had no "logical stopping point."
8 3
73. Id. at 283-84 (indicating that "[o]ther, less intrusive means of accomplishing simi-
lar purposes-such as the adoption of hiring goals-are available").
74. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
75. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978).
76. See Johnson v. Transporatation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 652 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). AlthoughJohnson approved an affirmative action plan that discriminated on
the basis of sex under Title VII, Justice O'Connor stated, "I see little justification for the
adoption of different standards for affirmative action under Title VII and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause." Id.
77. These categories are based on a logical extension of the principles enunciated in
Wygant and Johnson.
78. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
79. Id. at 722 (emphasizing that "[tlhe mere recitation of a benign, compensatory pur-
pose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes
underlying a statutory scheme" (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648
(1975)).
80. Id. at 716-17. The plan was struck down under both prongs of the test. Id. at 723-
24.
81. Id. at 713. Minority firms, known as Minority Business Enterprises, included a
business from anywhere in the country at least 51% of which is owned and controlled by
black, Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut citizens.
82. Id. at 723.
83. Id. (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275).
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Second, the city's "sheer speculation" about the number of minor-
ity firms that would have been located in Richmond but for "past socie-
tal discrimination" did not amount to identifiable discrimination under
the equal protection clause. 84 In other words, the city had no strong
basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.8 5
Accordingly, the Court rejected the argument that past societal discrimi-
nation alone can serve as an adequate factual predicate for affirmative
action plans based on race.
8 6
The Court also held that the Richmond plan was not "narrowly tai-
lored." The city failed to consider alternative, race-neutral ways to in-
crease minority participation in government construction projects, and
the rigid 30% quota was not narrowly tailored to fit the flexible goal of
encouraging minority businesses.8 7 Instead, the quota was based on the
completely unrealistic assumption that "minorities will choose a particu-
lar trade in lockstep proportion to their representation in the local pop-
ulation." 8 8 The Court stated that the "administrative convenience" of a
quota system is not sufficient to make a plan constitutional.8 9 Thus,
Croson suggests that the Court is returning to the "never" spirit of Brown,
at least in the context of equal protection.9 0
E. Title VII- The "Always" Response
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19649 1 expressly prohibits em-
ployers from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
84. Id. at 724.
85. Id. at 727 (observing that "none of the evidence presented by the city points to
any identified discrimination in the Richmond construction industry").
86. The Court stated:
To accept Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as
the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to competing
claims for "remedial relief" for every disadvantaged group. The dream of a Na-
tion of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity
and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inher-
ently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs .... We think such a result would be
contrary to both the letter and spirit of a constitutional provision whose central
command is equality.
Id.
87. Id. at 728.
88. Id.; accord Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 494 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (commenting that "[i]t is completely unrealistic
to assume that individuals of each race will gravitate with mathematical exactitude to each
employer or union absent unlawful discrimination").
89. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 729 (stating that "the interest in avoiding the bureaucratic
effort necessary to tailor remedial relief to those who truly have suffered the effects of
prior discrimination cannot justify a rigid line drawn on the basis of a suspect classifica-
tion. '[W]hen we enter the realm of strict judicial scrutiny, there can be no doubt that
administrative convenience is not a shibboleth, the mere recitation of which dictates con-
stitutionality' " (quoting Frontiers v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (plurality
opinion))).
90. The Court expressly stated that it agreed with Justice Powell's analysis that "the
guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and
something else when applied to a person of another color." Id. at 721 (quoting Bakke, 438
U.S. at 289-90).
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 20 00e - 2 000e-17 (1986).
1990] 429
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
national origin.9 2 Congress's objective in passing Title VII "was to
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that
have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employ-
ees over other employees." 9 3 The first major Supreme Court case inter-
preting Title VII was Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
94
Prior to July 2, 1965, the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Duke Power Company openly discriminated against blacks in em-
ployment decisions. Although Duke Power hired blacks, it assigned all
black workers to the labor department, where the highest paying jobs
were less lucrative than the lowest paying jobs in all of the other depart-
ments. When Title VII became effective, Duke Power abandoned its
policy of restricting blacks to the labor department. In order to transfer
out of the labor department, however, employees either had to possess a
high school diploma or pass two professionally developed ability tests.
Because a higher percentage of whites had high school diplomas, and
because whites tended to score better on the tests, these requirements,
although facially neutral, adversely affected blacks as a group.
9 5
The disgruntled blacks challenged the new transfer requirements
under Title VII, contending that the requirements operated as "built-in
headwinds" 96 against them. 9 7 The Griggs Court agreed, and held that
Duke Power's educational requirements and testing practices disadvan-
taged blacks as a group.
98
With the Court's unanimous decision, the foundations for the dis-
parate impact theory were laid, and the debate over the legality of race-
conscious voluntary affirmative action plans was begun. On one hand,
the Court stated that "preference for any group, minority or majority, is
precisely ... what Congress proscribed." 99 But, on the other hand, the
Court stated:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain
from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have oper-
ated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employ-
ees over other employees. Under the Act, practices,
92. Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(l), (d).
93. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 430 n.6; see also Belton, supra note 15, at 542.
96. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
97. The issue for the Griggs Court was:
[W]hether an employer is prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII,
from requiring a high school education or passing of a standardized general intel-
ligence test as a condition of employment in or transfer to jobs when (a) neither
standard is shown to be significantly related to successful job performance, (b)
both requirements operate to disqualify Negroes at a substantially higher rate
than white applicants, and (c) the jobs in question formerly had been filled only
by white employees as part of a longstanding practice of giving preference to
whites.
Id. at 425-26.
98. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436. Today, this theory of discrimination is commonly referred
to as "disparate impact." See infra note 105.
99. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
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procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in
terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to
"freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices. 0 0
Because Griggs prohibits both disparate impact and disparate treatment,
it plays an important role in the debate over whether antidiscrimination
laws protect individuals'01 or groups.1
0 2
There are three notable differences between the disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact theories of discrimination. First, disparate
treatment is based on a statutory construction of Title VII,
§ 703(a)(1),' 0 1 while disparate impact is based on a construction of
§ 703(a)(2).' 0 4 Second, a plaintiff can prevail under disparate treatment
only if he or she proves that the defendant intended to discriminate
against him or her. Under disparate impact, the defendant's intent is
irrelevant. Instead, a plaintiff must show that a particular employment
practice results in injury to a group because of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin, and that the practice is not related to business neces-
sity. 1
0 5 Finally, disparate treatment is premised on the concept that in-
dividuals should be treated equally. It protects people on an individual
100. Id. at 429-30.
101. See, e.g., Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 Yale L.J.
995 (1984).
102. Blumrosen, The Group Interest Concept, Employment Discrimination, and Legislative In-
tent: The Fallacy of Connecticut v. Teal, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 99 (1983).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1986) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(l) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges or
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to limit, segregate,
or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or in any
way adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
105. The disparate treatment theory of discrimination is easily distinguished from dis-
parate impact on the basis of intent. In order to impose liability under Title VII, the for-
mer requires an intent to discriminate on the basis of race or sex. The latter does not.
"Disparate treatment" such as is alleged in the present case is the most easily
understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be
inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment. See, e.g., Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66. Undoubt-
edly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it
enacted Title VII. See, e.g., I10 Cong. Rec. 13088 (1964) (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey) ("What the bill does ... is simply to make it an illegal practice to use
race as a factor in denying employment. It provides that men and women shall be
employed on the basis of their qualifications, not as Catholic citizens, not as Prot-
estant citizens, not asJewish citizens, not as colored citizens, but as citizens of the
United States.").
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress
"disparate impact." The latter involves employment practices that are facially
neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on
one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity .... Proof
of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required under a disparate-impact
theory .... Either theory may, of course, be applied to a particular set of facts.
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basis, and looks forward to a blirld society in which all persons, regard-
less of race or sex, compete equally for benefits and opportunities.
10 6
Disparate impact, on the other hand, protects groups, and is designed to
eliminate the present effects of past discrimination.
10 7
F. Title VII- The "Never" Response
The "never" response in Title VII cases was conceived in Griggs
when the Court stated that "[d]iscriminatory preference for any group
... is precisely . . .what Congress has proscribed."' 1 8 It was born in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 109 when the Court employed the dispa-
rate treatment test to find the possibility that a black plaintiff had not
been discriminated against on the basis of race. It matured in McDonald
v. Santa Fe Trail Transporation Co. I 10 when the Court held that Title VII
protected whites as well as blacks, and it died in United Steelworkers v.
Weber I " when the Court engaged in judicial legislation and interpreted
Title VII to permit overt discrimination against whites.
1. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 112 differed from Griggs in that it did
not involve standardized tests that excluded capable blacks. In McDon-
nell, a black plaintiff sued his employer on grounds that he had been
denied re-employment due to his race and persistent involvement in the
civil rights movement. After analyzing the facts, the Court determined
that the plaintiff may have been rejected not because of race, but be-
cause of prior unlawful behavior and remanded the case for resolution
of this issue.1 13 Thus, McDonnell Douglas may not have constructed
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
Under the disparate impact theory of discrimination, employment practices and poli-
cies that have an adverse impact or effect on the employment opportunities of any group,
e.g., blacks and women, are unlawful under Title VII, unless they are job-related and man-
dated by business necessity. The Griggs Court stated that whenever "an employment prac-
tice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance,
the practice is prohibited" under Title VII. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971).
106. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (illustrating the Court's struggle with
the individual/group problem).
107. The disparate treatment theory may be analogized to a footrace in which everyone
lines up at the starting line and then races for the finish, separated only by their competi-
tive abilities rather than by immutable characteristics such as race or sex. Disparate im-
pact, on the other hand, is concerned more with redressing past societal discrimination
against blacks and women as groups. Proponents argue that even if everyone is lined up
equally at the starting line, the race still is inherently unfair. Blacks and women remain
handicapped due to the ball and chain effects of societal discrimination. Thus, there is not
a true race if some of the competitors (blacks and women) must run with ankle weights
(societal discrimination) while others in the same race (whites, males, and white males) are
allowed to run free. Belton, supra note 15, at 541 n.38.
108. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
109. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
110. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
111. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
112. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
113. Id. at 806.
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arbitrary barriers like those the Court had criticized in Griggs. Instead, it
may have merely denied an undeserving plaintiff employment, a deci-
sion supported by the Court. The Court based its decision on § 703
(a)(1), the disparate treatment provision, rather than the disparate im-
pact theory advanced in Griggs. The concept of disparate treatment,
however, matured in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.. 114
2. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
In McDonald, three individuals, two whites and a black, were
charged with misappropriating cans of antifreeze. The whites were
fired, but the black was retained. The whites sued under Title VII, only
to have their case dismissed by the district court. The Supreme Court,
however, reversed on grounds that Title VII prohibits all racial discrimi-
nation.' 15 Employing disparate treatment rather than disparate impact,
the Court held that Title VII protects whites as well as blacks-the
"never" response. ' 16
Currently, there are two competing theories of protection under Ti-
tle VII-disparate impact and disparate treatment. The former protects
groups, the latter individuals. Unfortunately, employers face a dilemma
under both. They risk potential liability from minority groups, women's
groups, and minority women's groups under disparate impact if they do
not receive preferential treatment. Yet, they may be sued by whites,
males, or white male individuals under the disparate treatment theory if
preferential treatment is given to minority groups. Consequently, the
Court adopted a compromise position-the "sometimes" response.
114. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
115. The Court stated that the "act prohibits all racial discrimination in employment
without exception for any group of particular employees." Id. at 283 (emphasis added).
116. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984), however, is a
more recent example of the Court's "never" response under Title VII. In Stotts, the issue
before the Court was whether the district court erred when it enjoined the City of Mem-
phis from laying off black employees pursuant to the seniority principle of"last hired, first
fired." The city fire department previously had been sued for racial discrimination by a
class of black firefighters. To settle the suit, the city entered into a consent decree
designed to "remedy the hiring and promotion practices 'of the department with respect
to blacks.' " The decree, however, did not address layoffs.
Approximately one year later, due to "projected budget deficits," the city was forced
to layoff several employees. At the request of black employees, the district court enjoined
the city from adhering to the "last hired, first fired" principle insofar as it would decrease
the percentage of blacks already employed. The district court, relying on the Griggs dispa-
rate impact theory, held that the city could not adhere to the seniority principle of layoffs
because it would result in a discriminatory effect on black employees who had recently
been hired under the consent decree. Pursuant to the injunction, the city either (1) laid off
white employees with more seniority than black employees or (2) demoted them in rank.
The Supreme Court rejected the Griggs argument and invalidated the injunction under
§ 703(h) ofTitle VII which protects bona fide seniority systems if they do not intentionally
"discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." The Stotts holding
can be interpreted to prohibit all preferential treatment ol the basis of race to nonvictims
of discrimination. It "never" allows discrimination on the basis of race in favor of any
individual who is not an "actual victim" of racial discrimination.
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G. Title VII - The "Sometimes" Response
1. Private Employers
United Steelworkers v. Weber' 7 is representative of the era of civil
rights jurisprudence under Title VII during which the Court tried to
harmonize individual and group concerns. In Weber, a white employee
who had been passed over for an in-plant training program in favor of a
black with less seniority, initiated a class action reverse discrimination
suit under §§ 703(a) 1 18 and 703(d) 1 9 of Title VII.
Kaiser Aluminum, Weber's employer, and the United Steelworkers
of America, Weber's union, implemented a voluntary affirmative action
plan which included a dual seniority selection process. The plan al-
lowed minority and female employees to attend craft training programs
before white males with more seniority. Kaiser implemented the plan
because it feared possible Title VII disparate impact actions due to the
underrepresentation of blacks in its workforce.
120
In Weber, the Court had to determine whether, in a collective bar-
gaining agreement freely entered into by a private employer, a race-con-
scious employment plan with remedial purposes constituted legal
"affirmative action"'1 1 or illegal "reverse discrimination."' 12 2 The dis-
trict court and the Fifth Circuit invalidated the plan as reverse discrimi-
nation under §§ 703(a)(1) and (d).
The Supreme Court, however, reversed and reinstated the plan.
Justice Blackmun praised the wisdom of the court of appeals dissent,
which characterized the employer's predicament after Griggs and McDon-
ald as walking a "high tightrope without a net beneath them."' 2 3 The
analogy recognized the employer's potential liability to minorities under
the disparate impact (group) theory if race-conscious plans were not im-
plemented, as well as the potential liability to whites under disparate
treatment (individual) theory if race-conscious plans were adopted.
In holding that Title VII "does not condemn all private voluntary,
race-conscious affirmative action plans," 124 the Weber Court chose to in-
voke the "spirit" of Title VII and congressional emphasis on voluntary
117. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
118. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1986) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization,
or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other train-
ing or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against
any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admis-
sion to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or
other training.
120. See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 228-29 (5th Cir.
1977), rev d, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
121. See Executive Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e notes (1981).
122. See Weber, 563 F.2d at 218-21. For purposes of this article, "reverse discrimina-
tion" means discrimination based on race or sex which would be illegal if directed against
minorities and women, but legal if directed against whites and males.
123. l!'eber, 443 U.S. at 209-10 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 208.
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compliance, rather than adhere to the statute's actual wording.' 2 5 Thus,
for all practical purposes, the Court announced that the very sin which
had been expressly prohibited by Title VII-racial discrimination-is
sometimes an appropriate policy for private employers. Accordingly,
the Court rejected both the "always" (color-conscious) response of
group protection 126 and the "never" (colorblind) response of individual
protection. 1
27
In Weber, the Court held that race could be considered when a plan
(1) is designed to "break down old patterns of racial segregation and
hierarchy;" (2) "does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the
white employees;" (3) does not "create an absolute bar to the advance-
ment of white employees;" and (4) is a temporary measure designed to
eliminate a manifest racial imbalance rather than maintain a racial bal-
ance. 128 In Weber, the Court did not address whether race-conscious af-




In Johnson v. Transportation Agency,13 0 the Court addressed the ques-
tion of whether a public employer could "always," "never," or "some-
times" adopt a voluntary race- or sex-conscious affirmative action plan
without violating Title VII. The Santa Clara Transportation Agency, a
public employer, voluntarily adopted an affirmative action plan for hir-
ing and promoting minorities and women. The plan provided that the
agency could consider the sex or race of qualified applicants when mak-
ing promotions to positions within traditionally segregated job catego-
ries. When petitioner Johnson, a white male, was passed over for a
promotion to the position of road dispatcher, a skilled crafts position, in
favor ofJoyce, a woman who had scored slightly lower in the job inter-
view, he challenged the plan under Title VII, alleging that he had been
denied the promotion on the basis of sex.
13 1
The Court upheld the plan by concluding that it was voluntary, tem-
porary, and implemented to eliminate a manifest imbalance (rather than
to maintain a balance) of qualified women in skilled craft positions, a
traditionally segregated job category. Thus, in Johnson the Court ex-
tended Weber to public employers sued under Title VII.
After Weber and Johnson, both private and public employers "some-
times" may adopt voluntarily race- or sex-conscious affirmative action
125. Id. at 201-08.
126. By employing restrictive guidelines in its analysis, in [Veber the Court indicated
that it would not accept all race-conscious forms of group protection at the expense of
individual rights. The Court, however, did not define the outer limits of permissible vol-
untary race-conscious plans.
127. If the Court in Weber had responded "never" to the fundamental policy question,
it would have upheld Brian Weber's reverse discrimination claim under § 703 (a)(1).
128. 443 U.S. at 208.
129. Id. at 200.
130. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
131. Id. at 620 n.2.
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plans under Title VII. The plans, however, must (1) be designed to
break down old patterns of race- or sex-based segregation; (2) not un-
necessarily trammel the interests of other employees by requiring their
discharge or creating an absolute bar to their advancement; and (3) be
temporary. 132 In Johnson the Court, however, did not have the opportu-
nity to address whether race- or sex-conscious voluntary affirmative ac-
tion plans adopted by public entities would violate equal protection.1
3 3
III. ANALYSIS IN LIGHT OF WEBER, W'GANT, JOHNSON, AND CROSON
A. Factual Predicate
The "sometimes" response is prevalent in both equal protection'
3 4
and Title VII jurisprudence.' 3 5 It is a manifestation of the Court's de-
sire to harmonize the competing interests of individuals and groups.
The standards of the "sometimes" response, however, are still
developing.
Regardless of whether the legitimacy of a public plan is scrutinized
under the equal protection clause, as in Wygant and Croson, or under Ti-
tle VII, as in Weber and Johnson, the Court employs two criteria: First,
there must be a "legitimate factual predicate"' 136 for adopting the plan.
Second, the plan must be "narrowly tailored" to fit the specific goals of
the plan 137 so that it does not "unnecessarily trammel"' 3 8 the interests
of innocent third parties.'
3 9
In Wygant and Johnson, the Court applied different factual predicate
tests to the equal protection clause and Title VII. 140 The majority in
Johnson, for example, indicated that under Title VII, "societal discrimi-
nation" 14 1 alone is a legitimate factual predicate justifying a public vol-
132. Id. at 630; Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
133. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 620 n.2.
134. E.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); North
Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
135. E.g.,Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United Steelworkers
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
136. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 278 n.5 (1986); seeJohnson, 480 U.S. at 637; Ledoux v. District
of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1302-04 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated, 841 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
137. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 637-38; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
138. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 637-38.
139. Id. at 637-38; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 279-84.
140. Compare Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277 (using terms such as "convincing evidence" and
"strong basis in evidence" of prior discrimination to describe the proper circumstances in
which a voluntary affirmative action plan would be justified) with Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631
(describing the proper factual predicate as one in which a " '[mianifest imbalance' that
reflect[s] underrepresentation of women [and minorities] in 'traditionally segregated job
categories' " (quoting W1eber, 443 U.S. at 199)).
141. Belton, supra note 1, at 122 n.46 (" 'Societal discrimination' is a phrase used to
help explain, for example, the differences in the economic and educational status of blacks
and whites, the residential housing patterns based on race, the racially stratified job hierar-
chy in the work place, and the imbalance in positions of power of blacks ...." (quoting




untary affirmative action plan.14 2 The public employer did not have to
show a history of discriminatory practices 143 or even an "arguable viola-
tion"' 14 4 to promote qualified women to skilled craft positions. Rather,
it merely had to demonstrate a "manifest imbalance" in a traditionally
segregated job category.' 4 5 The evidence did not need to support a
prima facie case of intentional discrimination.
14 6
Wygant, however, consistent with strict scrutiny under the equal pro-
tection clause, 14 7 suggested that a much higher standard of proof is re-
quired under the Constitution.' 4 8 The plurality opinion emphasized
societal discrimination, without more, is not a legitimate factual predi-
cate for race-based state action.' 4 9 Rather, "convincing evidence that
remedial action is warranted" or "sufficient evidence to justify the con-
clusion that there has been prior discrimination" by the governmental
unit involved is required. 150 Thus, after Wygant and Johnson, lower
courts were forced to employ a different analysis for affirmative action
plans challenged under equal protection and Title VII.151
On January 23, 1989, however, the Court decided Croson, in which
the majority implicitly rejected both Wygant's "strong basis" and Justice
O'Connor's "firm basis"1 52 factual predicate standard. 153 The firm ba-
142. Compare Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630-33; Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 81 (D.C. Cir.
1987); Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 356 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1310 (1989) with Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (concluding that "[s]ocietal discrimination, with-
out more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy"). But see
.Johnson, 480 U.S. at 652 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (advocating use of the same analysis
under both equal protection and Title VII).
143. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 627-30. But see id. at 649-53 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (indi-
cating that before public employers implement an affirmative action plan they must have a
"firm basis for believing that remedial action was required").
144. Id. at 630.
145. Id. at 633 n.10.
146. Id. at 632. But see id. at 649 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "[tihe em-
ployer must have had a firm basis for believing that remedial action was required. An
employer would have such a firm basis if it can point to a statistical disparity sufficient to
support a prima facie claim").
147. Under the fourteenth amendment, any racial distinction is inherently suspect and
receives strict judicial scrutiny. The level of scrutiny does not change merely because the
challenged classification operates against whites and in favor of blacks. "Any preference
based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examination to
make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273
(quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980)).
148. Id. at 274; accord Johnson, 480 U.S. at 627 n.6.
149. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (emphasizing that "[s]ocietal discrimination, without
more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy" under the
Constitution).
150. Id. at 277.
151. Michigan Road Builders Ass'n v. Milliken, 834 F.2d 583, 585 n.3 (6th Cir. 1987),
aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 1333 (1989); Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 84-88 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Sil-
berman, J., concurring); Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 356-60 (9th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1310 (1989); Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1304-06
(D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated, 841 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Britton v. South Bend Community
School Corp., 819 F.2d 766, 779 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987).
152. Justice O'Connor's "firm basis" test requires a statistical disparity between the
percentage of qualified minorities given the benefit and the percentage of qualified minori-
ties in the relevant market "sufficient to support a prima facie Title VII pattern or practice
claim" by minorities. [Vygant, 476 U.S. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in
judgment); see Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 725. The Croson majority purportedly adhered to Ily-
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sis standard, introduced in Justice O'Connor's Wygant concurrence, re-
quired a "strong basis in evidence for [the] conclusion that remedial
action was necessary." 154 For example, a gross statistical disparity alone
could, under the proper circumstances, constitute the firm basis sup-
porting affirmative action. 15 5 But, "[w]hen special qualifications are re-
quired to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general population
(rather than to a smaller group of individuals who possess the necessary
qualifications) may have little probative value."' 15 6 In Croson the Court,
however, by holding that past societal discrimination alone cannot serve
as an adequate factual predicate for affirmative action plans based on
race, adopted a more rigid standard.15 7 The lower courts now must de-
cide whether this equal protection holding governs Title VII cases.' 58
B. Narrowly Tailored
Prior to Croson,15 9 a public employer satisfied the legitimate factual
predicate by demonstrating either a manifest imbalance in a traditionally
segregated job category under Title VII 160 or by presenting credible ev-
idence of prior discrimination by a public entity under the equal protec-
tion clause. 16 1 In addition, the employer must show that the plan did
not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of (innocent) white employ-
ees." 16 2 In other words, the plan must be "narrowly tailored,"' 16 3 and
its impact on innocent third parties not unduly burdensome. Fortu-
nately, the current "narrowly tailored" test is identical under the Consti-
tution and Title VII;164 both ask whether a less restrictive means could
gant's "convincing evidence" of prior discrimination factual predicate. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at
730. But see id. at 754 n.12 (Marshall, J., dissenting). It is consistent with Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), which does not allow disparate impact claims under the four-
teenth amendment. Id. at 239 (stating that the "central purpose of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on
the basis of race").
153. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 754 n.12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
154. Id. (quoting l'ygant, 476 U.S. at 277).
155. Id. at 725.
156. Id. (quoting Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08
(1977)).
157. As Justice Marshall points out, Croson rejects the H'ygant standard, which equates a
prima facie pattern and practice violation of Title VII as equivalent to a prima facie viola-
tion of equal protection. Id. at 754 n.12 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
158. Although in Croson the Court hinted strongly that its answer was yes, the question
remains whether societal discrimination alone is a legitimate factual predicate under Title
VII.
159. After Croson, the standard under equal protection is closer to the Washington v.
Davis intentional standard. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 754 n.12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
160. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208;Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631.
161. Wlygant, 476 U.S. at 277.
162. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 637; IWeber, 443 U.S. at 208.
163. IVygant, 476 U.S. 280 n.6 (explaining that "the term [narrowly tailored] may be
used to require consideration whether lawful alternative[s] and less restrictive means could
have been used").
164. Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that
"[c]onceptually, there appears to be no reason why... [this test] should differ depending
on whether the plan is analyzed under Title VII or the Constitution"), vacated, 841 F.2d





In Wygant and Johnson, the Court distinguished layoffs from hiring
goals. 16 5 Both cases indicated that preferential layoffs based on race or
sex were unduly burdensome on innocent individuals. Plans employing
discriminatory layoffs were not "narrowly tailored" under equal protec-
tion 166 or Title VII. ' 6 7 Race- or sex-based hiring and promotions, how-
ever, are considered to be narrowly tailored under both equal
protection 168 and Title VII, 16 9 because hiring goals impose only a "dif-
fuse burden" upon innocent third parties. 1
70
In its analysis of whether preferential promotions unnecessarily
trampled on the rights of innocent third parties, in Johnson the Court
examined several factors, 17 1 such as (1) whether the promoted em-
ployee was "qualified" for the promotion; 172 (2) whether the plan cre-
ated goals 173 or quotas;' 74 (3) whether the promotion uprooted
legitimate expectations; '5 and (4) whether the plan intended to attain
rather than maintain a balanced work force. 176 Because the promotion
to a skilled crafts position was given to a qualified (albeit less qualified)
recipient; did not cause the innocent victim to lose his job, suffer a de-
crease in salary, seniority, or cause him to become ineligible for future
promotions; was intended to attain the goals of the remedial plan rather
than maintain a balanced workforce by quotas; and did not uproot any
of the innocent male victim's "legitimate firmly rooted expecta-
tion[s],"' 17 7 the Court upheld the plan. 178 After Johnson, lower courts
held that preferential promotions were even less intrusive than hiring
goals.' 79 Croson, however, with its more stringent standard, indicates
that the Court would reject this analysis under equal protection. 18
0
Although Croson brings the Court's historical circle of post-Brown
165. 1l1vgant, 476 U.S. at 283-84; see Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638.
166. R'ygant, 476 U.S. at 283-84.
167. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 637-38.
168. See Iygant, 476 U.S. at 283-84.
169. Johnson, 480 U.S. 639-40.
170. Ivygant, 476 U.S. at 283.
171. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 637-40.
172. Id. at 638.
173. Id. at 639. Although in the real world the operational distinction between goals
and quotas may be insignificant, the theoretical difference applied in legal analysis of af-
firmative action plans is significant. Goals are merely "statement[s] of aspiration" that do
not have to be met. Id. at 654 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
174. The plan in this case cautioned that goals should not be construed as quotas that
must be met. Id. at 654 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 638.
176. Id. at 639.
177. Id. at 638.
178. Id. at 642.
179. E.g., Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 359-60 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 1310 (1989).
180. After Croson, hiring goals and promotions based solely on race are not narrowly
tailored. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 729 (declaring that "[u]nder Richmond's scheme, a suc-
cessful black, Hispanic, or Oriental entrepreneur .. .enjoys an absolute preference over
other citizens based solely on their race. We think it obvious that such a program is not
narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of prior discrimination").
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equal protection analysis closer to the "never" response, there are still
several alternatives to be considered. First, the Court should expressly
overrule Weber and Johnson, and unequivocally adopt the Croson strict
scrutiny factual predicate standard for both Title VII and equal protec-
tion cases. In addition, Congress should consider amending Title VII to
permit discriminating on the basis of race and sex in favor of minorities
and women,' 8 ' enacting an "Affirmative Action Relief Act," 182 or
both. 183
IV. ALTERNATIVES
A. Overrule Weber and Johnson
The Supreme Court should overrule Weber 184 and Johnson.18 5
Members of Congress could not have drafted a clearer prohibition
against any type of discrimination based on race or sex than when they
drafted §§ 703(a), (d), and (j) of Title VII. 18 6 The provisions proscribe
discrimination against any individual; classification of employees in a
manner that would deprive or tend to deprive "any individual from em-
ployment opportunities or in any way adversely affect his status as an
employee"; and mandatory "preferential treatment to any individual or
to any group because of race . . . or imbalance which may exist." 18 7
Whether analyzed alone or in conjunction with its legislative history, the
181. Congress has authority under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment to amend Title
VII to permit discrimination on the basis of race and sex in favor of minorities and women.
See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 719.
182. But see N. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 831 (1988) [hereinafter "LEGISLATION"] (the LEGIS-
LATION authors do not recommend this option).
183. 1 do not advocate either option.
184. ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia have expressed a desire to
overrule lVeber. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 657 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 669-75 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Weber, 443 U.S. at 219 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Their understanding of
Weber is that the employment plan at issue did not violate Title VII because "it was
designed to remedy intentional and systematic exclusion of blacks by the employer and the
unions from certain job categories." Johnson, 480 U.S. at 457. After Johnson, however, the
phrase at issue in W1eber, "traditionally segregated jobs," is interpreted to mean nothing
more than "a manifest imbalance between one identifiable group and another in an em-
ployer's labor force." Id. at 657. According to the Justices, this interpretation is a perver-
sion of Title VII. Id.
185. Johnson should be overruled on the same grounds as Wleber.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976) provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any em-
ployer, employment agency, labor organization, orjoint labor-management com-
mittee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual
or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such
individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to
the total number or percentage of persons of any race color, religion, sex, or
national origin employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment
by an employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or clas-
sified by any labor organization, or admitted to or employed in, any apprentice-
ship or other training program, in comparison with the total number or
percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any
community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work force in any
community, State, section, or other area.
187. See supra notes 103-04, 119, 186 and accompanying text.
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words and spirit of Title VII are clear. 188 Discrimination based on race
or sex, whether employed for or against minorities, is illegal.
The Supreme Court in Weber had neither the duty nor the authority
to legislate judicially and to ignore the plain words and legislative his-
tory of the statute.1 89 In a single stroke, the Court effectively rewrote
Title VII and violated the separation of powers doctrine. 190 Although
the result may have been desirable, the method was intellectually dis-
honest. Judge Benjamin Cardozo warned about this type of judicial ac-
tivism when he wrote:
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is
not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming
at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He
is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is
not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to value and unregulated
benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradi-
tion, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and
subordinated to the "primordial necessity of order in the social
life." Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion
that remains. 19 1
Weber served as express precedent for Johnson, Wygant, and
Croson.192 Rather than continuing to sanction the race- and sex-based
policy of robbing Peter to pay Paul (and Paula),' 9 3 the Court should
gracefully and immediately acknowledge its mistake. Three Justices in
Johnson openly advocated overruling Weber. 194 Two other Justices have
188. But see Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (majority and dissent debate
whether the disparate impact theory under § 703(a)(2) of Title VII protects groups or
individuals).
189. Weber, 443 U.S. at 228-29 n.9 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting):
If the words are plain, they give meaning to the act, and it is neither the duty nor
the privilege of the courts to enter speculative fields in search of a different mean-
ing. ". . . [W]hen words are free from doubt they must be taken as the final
expression of the legislative intent, and are not to be added to or subtracted from
by considerations drawn ... from any extraneous source." (quoting Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917)).
190. The Weber dissent, 443 U.S. at 216 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), states:
The Court reaches a result I would be inclined to vote for were I a Member of
Congress considering a proposed amendment of Title VII. I cannot join the
Court's judgment, however, because it is contrary to the explicit language of the
statute and arrived at by means wholly incompatible with long-established princi-
ples of separation of powers. Under the guise of statutory "construction," the
Court effectively rewrites Title VII to achieve what it regards as a desirable result.
It "amends" the statute to do precisely what both its sponsors and its opponents
agreed the statute was not intended to do.
See also Johnson, 480 U.S. at 644 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that "the only problem
for me is whether to adhere to an authoritative construction of the Act that is at odds with
my understanding of actual intent of the authors of the legislation"); id. at 670 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (indicating that "[i]t is well to keep in mind just how thoroughly Veber rewrote
the statute it purported to construe").
191. Weber, 443 U.S. at 218-19 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting B. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921)).
192. Veber and Johnson were decided under Title VII; Wlygant and Croson under the
Constitution.
193. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 781 (1976) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
194. See supra note 184.
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indicated a willingness to overrule Weber but for stare decisis. 19 5
Overruling Weber would tackle the discrimination problem head-on.
Admitting that Weber was a good idea that made bad law would open the
door to a new national policy that recognizes that distinctions based
solely on race or sex are wrong and undesirable. 1
9 6
The argument that Weber must be followed due to stare decisis, even if
it contains an erroneous interpretation of Title VII, sidesteps the issue
of whether the result was correct. Stare decisis is generally a wise pol-
icy. 19 7 But, it is just that, a policy, not a strict rule of law.' 9 8 As stated
in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services: "Although . . . stare
decisis has more force in statutory analysis than in constitutional adjudi-
cation because, in the former situation, Congress can correct our mis-
takes through legislation, we have never applied stare decisis mechanically
to prohibit overruling our earlier decisions determining the meaning of
statutes." 1 9 9 In fact, the Court has on numerous occasions overruled
one of its prior decisions, even though the correction might have been
made legislatively.2 0 0 The Court often "bows to the lessons of experi-
ence and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of
trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate." 20 '
The majority in Johnson stated that congressional silence following
the widely publicized Weber decision could be interpreted as acquies-
cence. If Congress had been displeased with the Court's construction of
Title VII, it could have amended the statute to expressly prohibit dis-
crimination against whites.
20 2
195. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 644 (Stevens, J., concurring) (insisting that "Bakke and
Weber have been decided and are now an important part of the fabric of our law"); id. at
648 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that "[i]f the Court is faithful to ... [s]tare
decisis we must address once again the propriety of an affirmative action plan . . . in light
of our precedents").
196. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273.
197. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
198. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
199. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978) (cita-
tions omitted).
200. See, e.g., Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406 n.l (1932), which states:
This Court has, in matters deemed important, occasionally overruled its earlier
decisions although correction might have been secured by legislation. See Chi-
cago & Eastern Illinois R. Co. v. Industrial Commission of Illinois, 284 U.S. 296,
overruling Erie R. Co. v. Collins, 253 U.S. 77, and Erie R. Co. v. Szary, 253 U.S.
86; Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 278 U.S. 349, 357, in part overruling
Friedlander v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 130 U.S. 416; Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 653, 659, overruling Ex parte Wisner, 203 U.S. 449; and quali-
fying In re Moore, 209 U.S. 490; Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co.,
246 U.S. 8, 25, and Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502,
518, overruling Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1; Rosen v. United States, 245
U.S. 467, 470, overruling United States v. Ried, 12 How. 361 (Compare Green v.
United States 245 U.S. 559, 561).
Id.
201. Burnet, 285 U.S. at 407-08 (footnotes omitted).
202. As an example, Justice Brennan cited General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125
(1976). In Gilbert, the Court had concluded that an employer's insurance plan which ex-
cluded pregnancy-related benefits was nondiscriminatory. Congress expressed its displea-
sure with Gilbert by passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C.
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The Court itself, however, has cautioned against relying solely on
congressional silence as a signal for adopting a controlling rule of
law. 20 3 Furthermore, the Court occasionally has altered its initial con-
struction of a statute when Congress refused to act. 20 4 For example, in
Monroe v. Pape,205 the Court held that § 1983206 did not reach munici-
palities. Although Congress remained silent for seventeen years, the
Court overruled Monroe in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Serv-
ices.20 7 Thus, Congress's post- Weber silence should not be interpreted as
approval of the Court's decisions.
Justice Scalia has advanced several persuasive reasons for overrul-
ing Weber.20 8 These reasons apply equally to Johnson. First, the Court
traditionally has adhered less rigidly to the doctrine of stare decisis when
interpreting civil rights statutes. 20 9 For example, stare decisis did not pre-
vent the Court from overruling Plessy. Second, inherent in the stare decisis
doctrine is the notion that the public interest lies in stability and the
orderly development of the law. 2 10 Weber was a radical departure from
Title VII precedents. 2 1 1 McDonald, for example, intended "to eliminate
all practices which operate to disadvantage the employment opportuni-
ties of any group."'21 2 Even Griggs21 3 stated that: "Congress has not
commanded that the less qualified be preferred over the better qualified
simply because of minority origins. Far from disparaging job qualifica-
tions as such, Congress has made such qualifications the controlling fac-
tor, so that race, . . . and sex become irrelevant." '21 4 Currently,
however, race and sex not only are relevant under Title VII, but after
Weber and Johnson, "the failure to engage in reverse discrimination is
economic folly, and arguably a breach of duty."
2 t 5
§ 2000e(k) (1978), and amending Title VII "to prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy." Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
203. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241 (1970)
(cautioning "that '[iut is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adop-
tion of a controlling rule of law' " (quoting Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69
(1946)); Boys Market, 398 U.S. at 255 (Stewart, J., concurring) (observing that "[w]isdom
too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late"
(quoting Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting))).
204. See, e.g., Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Even though Congress had been urged and had failed to overrule the Court's interpreta-
tion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), which precluded munici-
palities from coverage under the statute, the Court overruled Monroe in Monell.
205. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) is a federal civil rights statute that allows private citizens
to sue for the deprivation of a federal right caused by a state representative acting under
color of authority law.
207. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
208. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 669-77 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 672-73.
210. See id. at 644 (Stevens, J., concurring).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 643 (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280
(1976)).
213. See supra notes 94-107 and accompanying text.
214. Gnggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
215. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 676 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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By focusing on Congress's decision to emphasize the word "re-
quire" in § 703(j), rather than the phrase "require or permit," the Weber
Court misinterpreted the statute's intent. The Court thought that
"Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary race conscious affirmative
action,"' 2 16 and interpreted Title VII to permit voluntary race- or sex-
conscious discrimination against whites and males.
2 17
The intellectual dishonesty underlying the Weber holding manifests
itself in equivocation and semantics. The Court, in effect, called a horse
a cow. It substituted the words "affirmative action" for "discrimination"
to circumvent §§ 703(a) and (d). These provisions expressly prohibit
discrimination against any individual on account of race or sex. The
Court's interpretation of § 703(j) was not only "outlandish" in the light
of §§ 703(a) and (d), but was contradicted by Title VII's legislative his-
tory.21 8 For all practical purposes, the Court drafted legislation, an Ar-
ticle I function.
2 19
Weber is also inconsistent with Griggs. The Griggs Court held that
"discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is pre-
cisely . . . what Congress has proscribed [in Title VII]. ' ' 220 Johnson
should be overruled for the same reasons Weber should be overruled.
22 l
At a minimum, the Court should expressly adopt and apply a single af-
firmative action analysis to both Title VII and the Constitution.
B. Expressly Adopt a Uniform Analysis for Challenges of Equal Protection and
Title VII
Using separate factual predicate standards under the Constitution
and Title VII is confusing. It is incredible to think that a single fact
pattern could yield different legal results depending on whether a plain-
tiff sued under the Constitution or Title VII. 2 22 In Johnson, for example,
had the plaintiff sought relief under the equal protection clause rather
than under Title VII, the Court would have decided the case differ-
ently. 22 3 The same voluntary affirmative action plan that survived scru-
tiny under Title VII would have failed the more stringent factual
216. Weber, 443 U.S. at 206.
217. The problem with this construct is that it does not eliminate all race- or sex-based
discrimination, the articulated goal of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; it merely turns Title
VII into "a two-edged sword that must demean one [race or sex] in order to prefer an-
other." Id. at 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
218. Weber, 443 U.S. at 226-30; id. at 230-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
219. U.S. CONST. art. I.
220. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. Griggs is capable of being read as consistent with the Title
VII drafters' intention to eliminate all race- and sex-based discrimination. It should not be
overruled.
22 1. On the other hand, Congress may desire to amend Title VII to be consistent with
the Weber holding.
222. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632 (stating that "[w]e do not regard as identical the con-
straints of Title VII and the federal Constitution on voluntarily adopted affirmative action
plans"); see also Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1306-07 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
vacated, 841 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that appellants did not demonstrate that
the affirmative action plan was invalid under Title VII, yet remanding to determine
whether the plan satisfied the requirements under the Constitution).
223. See City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
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predicate standard employed under the equal protection clause. The
better qualified candidate would have received the promotion based on
merit, regardless of sex.
In order to provide the public with an orderly development of the
law, the Court should immediately adopt a uniform factual predicate
analysis. 224 Public employers and the general public should not be kept
guessing. They should know at the outset whether a plan will be struck
down or upheld under the Constitution and Title VII. Moreover, plain-
tiffs should not have to waste time and expense guessing whether to
litigate under equal protection, Title VII, or both.
The question then becomes: Which legitimate factual predicate
standard should the Court adopt? Should it adopt the lenient Johnson
standard, the more stringent Wygant standard, or some other factual
predicate standard?
Croson, an equal protection case, suggests that if the Court were to
adopt a uniform analysis, a modification of the Wygant standard could be
used. 2 25 To achieve the goal of an equal opportunity society, however,
the Court should adopt the more stringent Croson standard, which does
not permit affirmative action plans based solely on past societal discrimi-
nation. Croson tips the balance of competing concerns in favor of the
individual, thus reflecting our nation's desire to eradicate invidious dis-
crimination against all individuals.
In Wygant and Johnson, Justice O'Connor cautioned against requir-
ing public employers to admit prior illegal discrimination. 2 26 She was
concerned that such requirements would seriously undermine the value
of voluntary compliance. Justice O'Connor's warning is valid only if dis-
crimination on the basis of race or sex is an acceptable means to achieve
equality.
22 7
The Court's message in Croson announced that our society is not
going to tolerate a resurrection of the Plessy "separate but equal" doc-
trine. Our national goal is "equal opportunity for all our citizens."2 28
The Court affirmed Wygant's rejection of the "manifest imbalance" fac-
224. Four members of theJohnson Court suggested that a uniform approach be used to
analyze claims brought under the Constitution and Title VII. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 652
(O'Connor, J., concurring); see id. at 664 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
225. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 754 n. 12 (Marshall,J., dissenting). The Court rejected justice
O'Connor's "firm basis" approach articulated in Ilygant, 476 U.S. at 292, and Johnson, 480
U.S. at 650-5 1. AlthoughJustice O'Connor stated inJohnson, brought under Title VII, that
she could "see little justification for the adoption of different standards for affirmative
action under Title VII and the elqual [p]rotection [cllause," a plausible argument can be
made that the Court still has separate factual predicate standards under Title VII and the
Constitution. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 724 (commenting that "[t]here is nothing approaching a
prima facie case of a constitutional or statutory violation").
226. Wl'ganl, 476 U.S. at 289-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment); Johnson. 480 U.S. at 651-53 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
227. 1 vehemently disagree in principle with the proposition that "[i]n order to get
beyond racism, we must first take account of race." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407 (BlackmunJ.,
dissenting).
228. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 730 (Stevens,J., concurring in part and injudgment) (empha-
sis added).
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tual predicate standard under equal protection. The manifest imbalance
factual predicate standard undermines the "core purpose of the four-
teenth amendment which is to do away with all governmentally imposed
discrimination based on race."'22 9 This less stringent factual predicate
standard sanctions the samesin of overt racism that Justice Harlan found
abhorrent in Plessy.
2 30
Equality does not exist, nor can it be achieved, when equal protec-
tion under the law is applied unequally. The degree of equality an indi-
vidual is afforded should not depend on the fortuitous circumstance of
one's race or sex. 23 1 Prohibiting preferential treatment on the basis of
race or sex should be as fundamental as "two wrongs do not make a
right."'2 3 2 Voluntary public affirmative action plans that call for race- or
sex-based promotions, admissions, or hiring, should be stricken from
the "narrowly tailored" list.2 3 3 The Court's pre-Croson logic supporting
preferential promotions and hiring goals was not convincing. It beck-
oned to a dangerous new era of "separate but equal." '2 34 Lower courts
229. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)).
230. Croson also rejects Justice O'Connor's "firm basis" standard. Wygant, 476 U.S. at
292 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Johnson, 480 U.S. at
652 (O'Connor,J., concurring). Under her approach, prior to adopting a voluntary plan, a
public employer must have a firm basis for determining that affirmative action is war-
ranted. Under the proper circumstances, a statistical imbalance is sufficient to establish a
Title VII pattern or practice prima facie case, Note, Standards of Proof in Section 274B of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1323, 1343 (1988) (noting that
"[tihe phrase 'pattern or practice' has been construed by the courts as encompassing activ-
ities that are 'repeated, routine, or of a generalized nature' "), would satisfy the firm basis
under both Title VII,Johnson, 480 U.S. at 650-51, or equal protection. iygant, 476 U.S. at
292 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in judgment).
231. In Croson, the Court adopted Justice Powell's view in Bakke that "the guarantee of
equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something
else when applied to a person of another color." Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 721 (quoting Bakke,
438 U.S. at 289-90).
232. Weber, 443 U.S. at 228 n.10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Croson, the Court recog-
nized this truth when it stated:
To accept Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as
the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to competing
claims for "remedial relief" for every disadvantaged group. The dream of a Na-
tion of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity
and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inher-
ently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs.
109 S. Ct. at 727. But see id. at 740 (MarshallJ., dissenting) (stating that "today's decision
marks a deliberate and giant step backward in this Court's affirmative action
jurisprudence").
233. Although the Croson opinion comes close, it falls short in this regard. An excellent
articulation of the applicable reasoning is found in Justice Stewart's dissent in Minnick v.
California Dep't of Corrections, 452 U.S. 105, 128 (1981):
So far as the Constitution goes, a private person may engage in any racial
discrimination he wants ...but under the [e]qual [p]rotection [c]lause of the
[flourteenth [a]mendment a sovereign State may never do so. And it is wholly
irrelevant whether the State gives a "plus" or "minus" value to a person's race
whether the discrimination occurs in a decision to hire or fire or promote, or
whether the discrimination is called "affirmative action" or by some less euphe-
mistic term.
234. Although the Court's sanction of overt discrimination on the basis of race (Weber)
or sex Clohnson) is based on a benevolent desire to realize a fully integrated society, the
legal principle underlying the analysis is no different than that used in the Plessv majority.
When the dust settles, all that remains is "outcome determinative" constitutional law
rather than sound legal analysis. "Separate but equal" legal doctrines are the same legal
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were sensitized to this issue. 23 5
In principle, it does not matter whether discrimination occurs in the
form of a hiring quota, promotion, job offer, or admissions seat; or
whether the lost benefit comes in the form of a layoff, decrease in salary,
or disregard of seniority. Race or sex may, in theory, be "but one of
numerous factors," but in reality, it often is the dispositive factor.
23 6
The illegality of an act should not change merely because the outcome is
supposedly beneficial. All persons in our society have "legitimate firmly
rooted expectations- 23 7 to be treated equally by government. A gov-
ernment that bases decisions on immutable characteristics breeds
contempt.
Although Wygant held that layoffs were not sufficiently narrowly tai-
lored, the Court hinted that hiring goals would be. 23 8 It implied that a
person not hired because of race or sex is better off financially and psy-
chologically than a person fired for the same reason.2s9 Realistically, a
person not hired due to race or sex is worse off than one fired for similar
reasons. Whether the discrimination occurs like a headwind 240 or like a
whirlpool, 24 ' the force of discrimination is the same. Financially, for
example, the person's income is still zero. Psychologically, the victim
must deal with having been discriminated against.
A person not hired due to race or sex is arguably in a worse position
than one laid off. For example, a woman who is not hired because she is
black does not have income to pay the bills or feed her family. Unlike a
black woman fired because of race, the black woman not hired in the first
place does not have the opportunity to build an emergency savings ac-
count while she is employed. Furthermore, a black woman not hired is
deprived of the opportunity to develop on-the-job training skills that
increase her marketability. Thus, for the woman not hired, unlike the
animal, regardless of where they fall on the discriminatory spectrum. Discrimination on
the basis of race or sex does not shed its skin merely because the name is changed from
"separate but equal" to "affirmative action." Discrimination is discrimination. Regardless
of the underlying motives, the person discriminated against is harmed.
235. Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 87-88 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("But does not its hiring
plan . . . suggest the very evil that infected the Plessy doctrine?").
236. E.g.,Johnson, 480 U.S. at 663 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the district court
"concluded that DianeJoyce's gender was 'the determining factor' ").
237. But see Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638-40 (holding that men have no firmly rooted expec-
tations to be promoted over less-qualified females).
238. llyganl, 475 U.S. at 282-84.
239. Id. at 283.
240. Discrimination based on race or sex in the form of preferential hiring goals, ad-
mission seats, and promotions is analogous to an Oklahoma headwind. It, like a
headwind, slows a person's progress by pushing against an individual trying to go forward.
Under these circumstances, two results are inevitable. First, even the strongest person
eventually will tire of fighting the wind and cease progressing forward. Second, the person
fighting the headwind will not advance as far as he or she would have, had the wind been at
his or her back or had there been no wind at all.
24 I. Discrimination in the form of layoffs, loss of seniority, or decreases in salary is
analogous to a whirlpool. Like a whirlpool whisking innocent animals down to unknown
depths. simply because they had the misfortune of falling into it, discrimination pulls inno-
cent individuals down by lowering their status quo.
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woman who was hired but later fired, the door of opportunity is never
opened. It is slammed shut before she ever steps through.
In Wygant, the Court implied that the burden of a hiring quota
would be sufficiently narrowly tailored because, if a person did not re-
ceive a particular position due to race or sex discrimination, she could
be hired when the next job opportunity came along.24 2 The plurality
cited the "school admissions" cases as conceptually analogous to those
in which the affirmative action plans contained preferential hiring
goals. 24 3 Citing DeFunis v. Odegaard,24 4 the Court insinuated that every-
one rejected from a professional or graduate school on the basis of race
or sex, or not hired by a particular employer, would be accepted or hired
somewhere else.
24 5
This logic casually embraces the notion that "only one of several
opportunities" is foreclosed. 24 6 The realistic possibility of a marginally
qualified applicant being rejected by all public schools or not being
hired by any public employer was callously dismissed. Moreover, the
financial and psychological burden imposed on individuals denied any
opportunity on the basis of race or sex could not possibly be as diffuse
as Wygant suggests.
V. SAMESIN
Discrimination against blacks was the original sin 2 4 7 sanctioned by
the United States,2 48 its Constitution, 24 9 and the Supreme Court.
2 5 0
Reflecting on Dred Scott v. Sandford,25 1 one wonders how a "Nation
Under God" ever tolerated such inhumanity. Yet ours not only toler-
ated it, but our highest Court nodded approvingly. Whether the articu-
lated motive is cloaked in humanity, or prejudice,2 52 the principle is no
different. The odor of discrimination against people based on skin color
or sex is foul. Whether against blacks or whites, males or females, the
stench is the same-sin.
As currently implemented, affirmative action embodies the notion
of preferential treatment of minorities and women as groups, rather
than equal opportunity for all individuals. 25 3 Erroneous assumptions
implicit in affirmative action plans erode their credibility. Plans incor-
242. l1",gant, 476 U.S. at 283 (declaring that "hiring goals impose a diffuse burden [on
an innocent victim], often foreclosing only one of several opportunities").
243. Id. at 283 n. l.
244. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
245. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283 n. 11.
246. Id. at 283.
247. See, e.g., Bell, Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5 nn.l-2, 6
nn.4-7, 7 nn.9-10 (1985).
248. T. SOWELL, ETHNIC AMERICA (1981).
249. Bell, supra note 247, at 7 n.9.
250. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
251. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857),
252. See, e.g., Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Debate, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1345 (1986) ("SPONGE" meaning The Society for the Prevention of
Niggers Getting Everything).
253. See supra notes 55-76, 117-33 and accompanying text.
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rectly assume that each individual within a protected group is systemati-
cally disadvantaged.2 54 The presumption is that every minority or
woman is disadvantaged due to "societal discrimination. '2 55 In our so-
ciety, however, minorities, like white males, occupy a wide-range of
socio-economic levels.
2 5 6
Furthermore, underlying the assumption that every minority is dis-
advantaged is the erroneous presumption that every white or male has
access to the "spoils" of the majority. 2 57 Should an aristocratic black
female, for example, be treated preferentially because she happens to be
black? Should an indigent white male be treated less favorably because
he happens to be white?2 58 Obviously not.2 5 9 The overt discrimination
against whites, males, and white males that flows from the operation of
voluntary affirmative action plans results in a modern "separate but
equal" society. The discrimination inherent in "separate but equal" and
samesin affirmative action plans is identical. It matters not whether dis-
crimination on the basis of race or sex is directed against blacks, or
whites, women or men. The sin is the same. Our nation's laws should
be blind.
260
Two categories of people participate in the affirmative action de-
bate--social redeemers '"261 and "samesinners. '"262 Social redeemers
stress that immutable characteristics, i.e., race, sex, and national origin,
are irrelevant. Samesinners advocate the exact opposite. Social re-
deemers urge equal treatment and opportunity for all individuals. Be-
cause they recognize the erroneous assumptions inherent in group
protection, social redeemers advocate blind rather than color-conscious
laws-the "never" approach. Social redeemers helped secure passage
of the thirteenth, 26 3 fourteenth, 2 64 and fifteenth 26 5 amendments to the
254. Sullivan, supra, note 2, at 93 (articulating that the Court could have held that "be-
cause American racism has left blacks an underclass, still systematically disadvantaged as a
group . . . no black is not a 'victim' of past discrimination").
255. Belton, supra note 15.
256. See, e.g., T. SOWELL, supra note 248.
257. Id.
258. In Croson, the Court clearly indicated that this kind of result would not survive the
narrowly tailored prong of equal protection analysis. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 729 (explaining
that "[ulnder Richmond's scheme, a successful black, Hispanic, or Oriental entrepreneur
from anywhere in the country enjoys an absolute preference over other citizens based
solely on their race. We think it obvious that such a program is not narrowly tailored to
remedy the effects of prior discrimination").
259. Judge Posner articulates the problem well: "[Tihe use of a racial characteristic to
establish a presumption that the individual also possesses other, and socially relevant,
characteristics exemplifies, encourages, and legitimizes the mode of thought and behavior
that underlies most prejudice and bigotry in modern America." Posner, The DeFunis Case
and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial linorilies, I SuP. CT. REV. 1, 12
(1974).
260. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that "[olur Constitution
is colorblind"). Justice Harlan's logic should be extended to other immutable
characteristics.
261. The term "social redeemer" is analogous to Morris B. Abram's "Fair Shaker."
Abram, supra note 14.
262. The term "samesinner" is analogous to Morris B. Abram's "social engineer." See
id. at 1313.
263. U.S. CONST. amend. XiI1 (outlawing slavery).
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Constitution. 2 66 It makes no difference to social redeemers whether
Plessy discriminated against blacks and Weber against whites.2 67  The
principle of discrimination on the basis of race or sex is the same-sin.
Samesinners, on the other hand, argue that this nation's civil rights
laws protect groups rather than individuals.2 68 They advocate that "in
order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently."
'2 6 9
Samesinners apply color-conscious constructions to colorblind statutes
in order to realize colorful results.
2 70
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has made a debacle of defining a
proper test for determining the legitimacy of public, voluntary affirma-
tive action plans. Prior to Croson, the Court employed separate two-
pronged tests to evaluate affirmative action plans, one under the Consti-
tution27 1 and another under Title VII. 2 72 The separate tests created the
possibility of conflicting legal outcomes under identical fact patterns.
The factual predicate prong was more stringent under the equal protec-
tion clause, requiring "convincing evidence" 27 3 of prior discrimination
rather than a "manifest imbalance." '2 74 This dichotomy forced the
courts to apply multiple standards.2 7 5 Society was left to speculate on
how to tailor its behavior. Although in Croson the Court kept separate
264. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (guaranteeing equal protection under the law).
265. U.S. CONST. amend. XV (extending the franchise).
266. Abram, supra note 14, at 1314 n.5.
267. Social redeemers, for example, litigated Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954). However, social redeemers also would overrule Weber and Johnson because their
holdings sanction overt discrimination against whites and males, respectively.
268. Blumrosen, supra note 102.
269. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Samesinners would be in favor
of helping the black children in Brown, but they would not be sympathetic to white Webers
nor male Johnsons. They would favor overt discrimination on the basis of race or sex in
favor of minorities and women. This type of sin-sanctioning is inconsistent with the no-
tion of a truly integrated society.
The underlying principle of sometimes sanctioning racism and sexism is dangerous
because it is governed by the subjective whims of whoever is in control-the majority. Did
Hitler think that he was benefitting society by his "affirmative action?" Currently, the con-
cept of race and sex-conscious affirmative action is used in a humanitarian way-to help
blacks and women achieve their rightful place in society. But, it would be naive to ignore
the fact that the principle can be twisted and perverted. I am not labelling supporters of
voluntary affirmative action as persecutors. I am, however, throwing out food for thought.
270. Justice Stevens is a good example:
[C]ongress intended to eliminate all practices which operate to disadvantage the
employment opportunities of any group protected by Title VII including Cauca-
sians. If the Court had adhered to that construction of the Act, petitioner would
unquestionably prevail in this case .... [Tihe only problem for me is whether to
adhere to an authoritative construction of the Act that is at odds with my under-
standing of the actual intent of the authors of the legislation. I conclude without
hesitation that I must answer that question in the affirmative ....
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 643-44 (Stevens, J., concurring).
271. See supra notes 140-51 and accompanying text.
272. Id.
273. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 151.
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standards, it adopted a more stringent equal protection test. 276
Croson marks the beginning of a new era. Voluntary public affirma-
tive action plans based solely on race have fallen from grace. 2 77 In
Croson the Court threw them into the abyss. 2 78 Now, as a matter of law,
public plans that discriminate on the basis of race are presumed uncon-
stitutional. 27 9 To overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality, the
racial preferences must be "narrowly tailored remedies of last resort for
particular acts of identified prior discrimination. ' 280 Croson indicates
that the Court is returning to the "never" race- or sex-conscious ap-
proach. It is taking a step toward the future-a future in which the de-
gree of equal opportunity afforded our individual citizens is not chained
to misguided policies of group entitlements. 2 8
1
Affirmative action in its purest form is a noble concept.2 82 It is nec-
essary to achieve the dream of an integrated society-one that offers
equal opportunity to all. Our society, however, should reject any form
of "racial spoils system." Condoning affirmative action plans that re-
quire preferential treatment based solely on immutable characteristics
such as race or sex resurrects the separate but equal era. Current race-
and sex-conscious plans operate no differently than the state law in
Plessy. They are discriminatory plans dressed in affirmative action cloth-
ing. Except in the most compelling circumstances, the inherent discrim-
ination that accompanies samesin affirmative action plans has no place
in our society.
276. Croson suggests that proof of specific victims is required under equal protection.
Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 727; id. at 754-55 n.12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
277. See supra notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
278. Revelations 20:3.
279. W. Reynolds, The Reagan Administration's Civil Rights Policy: The Challenge
for the Future (rev. transcript Feb. 17, 1989) (unpublished manuscript).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Affirmative action in its purest form exists without any discrimination on the basis
of race or sex. Educating our youth, providing adequate shelter for the homeless, and
attacking our nation's drug problem are only a few examples of unequivocal "affirmative
action." True affirmative action, unlike "samesin" affirmative action, builds toward a fu-
ture society where governmental decisions are indifferent to race and sex. See, e.g., id.
1990]

